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I. Introduction
N THIS SWIFTLY MOVING AGE, with its revolutionary advances
in so many diverse fields of activity, it is well to pause and
reflect upon the Role of the Law in American life. Unfortunately,
in our pre-occupation with daily chores, we miss the trees for
the forest, for to a large extent the Lawyer's time is taken up
with private interests which, while important to the individual,
do not touch the great and vital issues affecting the community.
Yet no Lawyer can have any real pride in his profession unless
he has the capacity for interpreting to himself and to his fellow
Americans the full Majesty and Meaning of the Law.
II. Law the Stabilizing Element in Modern Civilization-
Primitive Origins
Without becoming unduly involved in Philosophic Concepts
of Law and Justice which have been the subject of comment and
debate for many Centuries, it is enough here to note that without
Law man would be plunged back into the chaos from which we
emerged at the Dawn of Civilization. It is the Law that brings
an orderly society, where men may follow their pursuits, secure
in the knowledge that their rights will be protected and their
obligations enforced. It is the Law that protects the individual
against the Tyranny of his Sovereign.
For a proper understanding of our Law and our present
Legal Institutions, we must look back over the past Centuries to
the Origin and Growth of the Common-Law in England, for it
was that System of Law which shaped the thinking of our
Founding Fathers. The Origin of the Common Law may be
traced to the customs of the Germanic tribes who stood before
the Roman legions when Britain was still a Roman Province.1
It was influenced by the teachings of the Christian Church, after
* Of the Surrogates Court, New York County, N. Y.; formerly of the New
York Supreme Court; President, New York Law School; etc.
[Editors' Note: This article is the substance of an address given by
Surrogate Cox at New York Law School recently. The speech was deemed
to be of sufficient importance by the Hon. Ludwig Teller, Congressman
from N. Y., to have it printed in the Congressional Record. Footnotes have
been added by the author for the publication here.]
1 Pollock, The Genius of the Common Law, c. I, Our Lady and, Her Knights,
8 (New York, 1912).
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the conversion of the Roman Empire.2 Among the Germanic
traditions which took deep root were those of freedom and in-
dividual self-respect, concepts which have characterized the
Common-Law ever since, and which largely account for our
present-day liberties.3
m. Primitive Modes of Proof and Trial
As a result of the Germanic influence, early Justice in Eng-
land was formal and rigid,4-a characteristic of most primitive
societies and essential, in critical periods of Society, to prevent a
relapse into anarchy and barbarism. Only by making hard and
fast Rules, evidenced by concrete expression, could it be demon-
strated to the Primitive Mind that the Law was the same for all
men.5 In order, therefore, for a man to bring himself within the
protection of the Law, a suitor was required to follow the exact
words prescribed by the Legal Ritual, which controlled the
Primitive Modes of Proof and Trial which then prevailed. Thus,
it is not surprising to find that up until the Twelfth Century,
there was no human method for resolving issues of credibility,
this being left to the supernatural.6 Formalism was, therefore,
at its peak in these archaic Methods of Proof and Trial, the most
prominent of which were, Trial by Ordeal, by Oath or Wager of
Law and Trial by Battle. 7
The Primitive Trial involved two stages: In the first stage,
the Court rendered a Medial or Preliminary Judgment, which
merely involved the selection of the Method of Proof, to which
the defendant was to be put and the Time and Place of Trial; at
the second stage, the Judges acted somewhat as umpires to see
that the Method of Proof prescribed by the Preliminary Judg-
2 Maitland and Montague, A Sketch of English Legal History, c. I, Early
English Law, 600-1066 A.D., 21-23 (New York and London, 1929).
3 Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, c. I, The Feudal Element, 13-18
(Francetown, 1947); Pollock, The Genius of the Common Law, c. I, Our
Lady and, Her Knights, 8 (New York, 1912).
4 Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, c. I, The Feudal Element, 18-20
(Francetown, 1947).
r Pollock, The Genius of the Common Law, c. II, The Giants and the Gods,
14-17 (New York, 1912).
6 Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury, c. IV, The Judicial System of the Anglo-
Saxons, Section VI, Of Compurgators, 61-67 (New York, 1878).
7 Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, c. I,
The Older Modes of Trial, 7-46 (Boston, 1898).
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ment was strictly adhered to in the Specific Form of Trial
selected."
(A) Trial by Ordeal.-Perhaps the Earliest Form of the
Older Modes of Trial was the Ordeal, dating from before the in-
troduction of Christianity. As its practice was so widespread
among primitive people, and as it was based on the belief that
God intervened by some sign or miracle to determine an issue
pending between two adversaries, the Church felt obligated to
soften its harsh features by surrounding it with formal ceremo-
nies, which added to its moral and psychological effectiveness as
a test in the ascertainment of truth. According to Forsyth,9 an
accused was subjected to Trial by Ordeal: (1) Where he was
unable to secure a sufficient number of compurgators; (2) Where
he had been previously found guilty of perjury; and (3) Where
he was not a Freeman, unless his Lord swore to his innocence, or
purchased his freedom by paying the required weregild or fine.
Once a person was required to submit to Ordeal, he might
be subjected to either one of three Forms of Trial-the Ordeal
of the Hot Iron, the Ordeal of Hot Water, or the Accursed
Morsel. Without going into details, this Primitive Method of
Proof was open to corruption and perjury, produced few con-
victions and hence fell into decay, and in 1215 was condemned
by the Lateran Council, after which it was prohibited by a Writ
which Henry III (1216-1272) sent to his Itinerant Justices in
1219.
(B) Trial by Compurgation or Wager of Law.-Trial by
Oath was unknown to Roman Procedure; it was, however, known
among the barbaric tribes which overran England. Consequently,
this System of Trial was found in operation early in the Anglo-
Saxon Period of English history.10 In Trial by Oath, the plaintiff
made a Formal Affirmation or Charge, which was met by an
equally Formal Denial, controverting every point of plaintiff's
assertion, word for word. The adversary could stop the Oath
and challenge the swearer as incredible. But this could only be
done at the proper time, for an Oath once begun could not be
interrupted. To stop the Oath the hand had to be seized before
8 Ibid; Maitland and Montague, A Sketch of English Legal History, c. II,
English Law Under the Norman Rule and the Legal Reforms of Henry II
(1066-1216), 47 (New York and London, 1929).
9 Forsyth, History of Trial by Jury, c. IV, The Judicial System of the Anglo-
Saxons, Section V, 67-69 (New York, 1878).
10 See article by Pollock, English Law Before the Conquest, 1 Select Essays
in Anglo-American Legal History, c. III, 88, 92-95 (Boston, 1907).
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it was lifted to swear or before it touched the relic upon which
the Oath was to be made. Another method of stopping the Oath
was for the aggrieved party to bar the way into the Church by
stretching his arm or his sword across the door. In either event,
the Oath-Taker, in the same fashion, had to play his part exactly
as the ritual required.'
"A hand held up must not be lowered, a hand laid on
relics, or on a sword, or on the Oath Helpers, must not be
moved until the Oath is fully spoken. If nothing goes wrong
in the solemnity, if all the right words are said in the right
order, if all the hands and fingers keep their right station,
and, if all being duly done, the customary pause has elapsed
without anyone being visibly smitten by the divine wrath
for perjury, then the Proof is not only complete but con-
clusive." 12
Where a Crime was Charged one could not always escape
with an Oath. He could be sent to the Ordeal, which, as we have
seen, was conceived as the Judgment of God.13 The truth was
revealed by immersion in water or fire. The water in the pit was
adjured to receive the innocent and reject the guilty. He who
sank was safe. He who floated was lost. The red-hot iron, one
pound in weight, had to be lifted and carried three paces. The
hand that held it was then sealed in a cloth. Three days after-
wards the seal was broken, and if there was a blister "as large as
half a walnut," it was fatal.14
11 Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, c. I,
The Older Modes of Trial, 25-31 (Boston, 1898).
12 Pollock, The Genius of the Common Law, c. 11, The Giants and the Gods,
18 (New York, 1912).
13 Maitland and Montague, A Sketch of English Legal History, c. II, English
Law Under Norman Rule and the Legal Reforms of Henry II, 1066-1216,
48-49 (New York and London, 1929).
14 In 1824, in the case of King v. Williams, 2 B. & C. 538, 107 Eng. Rep. 483,
a defendant took the Court by surprise by throwing down the gauntlet and
demanding Trial by Wager of Law. The Judges, after full consideration,
decided that the defendant was well within his rights, although the pro-
cedure in such a Trial had been all but forgotten. A few years later, by the
Statute of 3 & 4 Win. IV, c. 42, § 13, 73 Statutes at Large 276 (1883), Trial
by Wager of Law was abolished.
In the United States, although recognized during the Colonial Period, it
really never gained a substantial foothold. In the leading case of Childress
v. Emory, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) 641, 671, Mr. Justice Story, after discussing the
Constitutional Right to Trial by Jury, observed that "Wager of Law, if it
ever had a legal existence in the United States, is now abolished."
It did, however, exist in the United States, for we find that it was ex-
pressly abolished in New York by a Statute, which reads: "That no Essoin
shall be allowed in any Suit, and no person shall be permitted to Wage his
Law in any case, except that of Non-Summons in Real Actions." [L. of
N. Y. 1801, 24 Sess., c. 90, § 24].
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(C) Trial by Battle.-And now we come to Trial by Battle,
which prevailed among the barbaric tribes of Europe, but was
unknown among the Anglo-Saxons until introduced by the
Norman Conquest, after which it was extensively applied in the
settlement of a wide variety of disputes, including both civil and
criminal cases.15 Thayer observes that this Mode of Trial was
viewed with suspicion, that the Ordeal was preferred over it,
hence when Trial by Ordeal was prohibited by Henry III (1216-
1272) in 1219, a wide gap was opened up to be filled by the now
rapidly developing Jury.16
In this Form of Trial, the accuser undertook, during the
course of the day, to prove, by his body, the truth of the charge;
if he failed to do this before twilight fell, he failed in his Proof
and in effect became a perjurer. The object was not to kill or
maim his adversary, but to make him pronounce the loathsome
word "craven." 17 Although the use of Champions to fight the
battles of the litigants was authorized by the Statute of West-
minster I (1275), this Form of Trial was distrusted. In 1215 Pope
Innocent III condemned it at the Lateran Council for the same
reasons which proved fatal to Trial by Wager of Law. Although
obsolete, it persisted until the early part of the Nineteenth
Century. In the year 1819 this Mode of Trial was finally abol-
ished by Statute.'
IV. Trial by Jury
(A) Establishment of a Centralized Court System.-After
the Norman Conquest and during the Twelfth and Thirteenth
Centuries, William the Conqueror and his successors took the
Decentralized Anglo-Saxon System of Courts, and superimposed
thereon the three Royal Courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas
and Exchequer,19 with Appellate Jurisdiction vested in the Court
15 Maitland and Montague, A Sketch of English Legal History, c. II, English
Law Under Norman Rule and the Legal Reforms of Henry II, 1066-1216,
48-49 (New York and London, 1929).
16 Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, c. I,
The Older Modes of Trial, 45-46 (Boston, 1898).
For the story of the subsequent development of the Jury, see Thayer,
A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, c. II, III, IV, Trial
by Jury and Its Development, 47-182 (Boston, 1898).
17 Maitland and Montague, A Sketch of Legal History, c. II, English Law
Under Norman Rule and the Legal Reforms of Henry II, 1066-1216, 50 (New
York and London, 1929).
18 59 Geo. I, c. 46 (1819).
19 2 Holdsworth, History of English Law, c. IV, The Reign of Edward I:
The Settlement of the Sphere of the Common Law, 352-401 (3rd ed. Boston,
1927).
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of Exchequer Chamber and the House of Lords. The develop-
ment of these Courts gave England a Centralized Court System.
As an incident of this development the archaic Methods of
Proof, as represented by the Ordeal, Wager of Law and Battle,
gradually fell into decay, while Trial by Jury, initially con-
ceived as a method of eliciting the facts in controversy from
twelve neighbors, developed into the Modern Jury of today, the
function of which is no longer to act as witnesses, but as triers
of facts.
(B) The Ecclesiastical Courts.-Shortly after William the
Conqueror took over, he issued what was known as the Ordi-
nance of 1077, separating the Common-Law and Ecclesiastical
Courts, with the Common-Law Courts retaining Jurisdiction
over Land,20 and hence of Devises of Land, while the Ecclesias-
tical Courts retained Jurisdiction over Testaments of Personalty
-a division which was destined to have a profound effect upon
the law of Real and Personal Property, as well as the Adminis-
tration of Estates and the Probate of Wills.
2
'
(C) The Court of Equity.-The evolutionary development
of the three Superior Common-Law Courts did not exhaust the
Judicial Powers of the King's Council. A Residuary Power re-
mained in the Council under which the King could have ad-
ministered Justice if all the other established Courts had ceased
operation. This great Residuary Power was now invoked by the
King for the alleged purpose of relieving the rigidity of the Com-
mon Law, which, for various reasons-social, economic, political
and religious-refused to take Jurisdiction of certain causes. In
consequence, suitors were left with no alternative but a direct
Petition to the King. In such cases the King by his Chancellor
investigated and decided the controversy. Out of this practice
there gradually developed a new tribunal known as the Court
of Equity, which could afford remedies not available in the Com-
mon-Law Courts.2 2 In this fashion the Chancellor, as the keeper
of the King's Conscience, brought much needed liberalization to
the Administration of Justice and provided the flexibility needed
to deal with the great changes that were taking place. The Com-
20 In this connection see Reppy, The Ordinance of William the Conqueror:
(1072), (New York, 1954).
21 1 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, c. VI, The Age of Brac-
ton, 193-197 (Cambridge, 1895).
22 See article by Holmes, Early English Equity, in 2 Select Essays in Anglo-
American Legal History, 705 (Boston, 1908); and see, Oleck, Historical
Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 20 Fordham L. R. 23 (1951).
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mon Law Courts and the Courts of Equity, after a Period of
Conflict, as we shall see, worked side by side, one influencing
and complementing the other.
V. The Tripartite Struggle Between the Courts for Jurisdiction
As a result of the foregoing development of the Common-
Law, Ecclesiastical and Equity Systems of Courts, it was inevi-
table that the Early History of English Law should be marked by
a continuing Struggle for Jurisdiction. As early as the Twelfth
Century, the Common-Law Judges were challenging the Church
over Issues of Jurisdiction and were asserting the Independence
of their Courts.2 3 And it was during this critical period that the
Common-Law Judges and Lawyers stood firm, resisting the trend
in favor of adopting the Roman Law, which at that time-the
Sixteenth Century-was sweeping over Europe.2 4
VI. The Struggle Between the Common-Law Courts
and the Crown
(A) Lord Coke and the Ecclesiastical Courts.-In the
Seventeenth Century the Common-Law became involved in a
battle against the Stuart Kings. When James I (1603-1625) first
came over from Scotland he found Coke in the midst of a battle
with the Ecclesiastical Courts, which were resisting his use of
the Writ of Prohibition to limit their Jurisdiction. The King
was aggravated by reason of the fact that in this struggle Coke
insisted that neither the Church nor the King was above the
Law. At that time, however, James I was not yet sufficiently
entrenched politically to challenge Coke. In consequence, the
Common-Law Courts took over a large portion of the Ecclesias-
tical Jurisdiction.
(B) Lord Coke and the Court of Equity: (1) The Suprem-
acy of the Law Concept.-In the same Century, battle was again
joined, this time between the Common Law and Equity Courts,
the latter supported by the Crown, with Coke reviving his earlier
view that the Law, as opposed to the King, was Supreme.
The issue arose when the Court of Common Pleas granted a
Writ of Prohibition against Temporal Action taken by an Ad-
ministrative Tribunal established for the Regulation of the
23 Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, c. I, The Feudal Element, 5-7
(Francetown, 1947).
24 Ibid.
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Church.25 The Archbishop of Canterbury complained to King
James I (1603-1625), before whom all of the Judges of England
were summoned, with Sir Edward Coke as their spokesman. The
Archbishop talked of the Royal Prerogative, that is, the right of
the King to do himself what he had delegated to his Judges.
Coke replied that under the Laws of England the King could
not adjudge any cause, that all cases were to be determined in
a Court of Justice according to the Law and Custom of the
Realm. The King took offense and regarded as treasonable the
suggestion that he should be under the Law. Coke's famous
answer was that the King ought not to be under any man, but
under God and the Law.26
(2) Coke's Use of Magna Carta.-In the foregoing contest,
Coke was resting his case on Magna Carta, which had been
wrung from King John four hundred years earlier at Runny-
mede and Marston Moor, in order to compel his recognition and
respect for certain basic rights, which are cherished by all men.
VII. Coke's Influence Upon American Constitutional Doctrine
The Role of the Magna Carta in the history of American
Constitutional Theory is due in large measure to the revival and
restatement of its principles by Lord Coke. The significance of
the Charter lay in the fact that it was drawn in terms that did
not confine its application to the immediate issues at hand or to
the interests therein involved. Its language was couched in terms
of universal application. For the history of American Constitu-
tional Law and Theory, the most important part of the Magna
Carta, was Chapter 29, which has been translated as follows:
"No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or deprived
of his freehold or of his liberties or free customs, or out-
lawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, nor shall we
go upon him, nor shall we send upon him, except by a legal
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land."
It is said that our Concept of Due Process of Law, upon
which so many of our liberties have turned, stems directly from
this provision.
Because of the Generality and Scope of the Language,
Magna Carta, from its inception, contained elements of growth.
In 1297 Edward I (1272-1307) ordered all "Justices, Sheriffs,
Mayors, and other Ministers, which under us and by us have
25 Id. at 60.
26 Id. at 61.
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the Laws of our Land to guide," to treat the Great Charter as
"Common Law" in all Pleas before them.27 Furthermore, any
Judgment contrary to the Great Charter was "to be holden for
naught"; and all Archbishops and Bishops were to pronounce
"the sentence of Great Excommunication against all those that
by deed, aid or counsel," proceeded contrary to the Charter or
in any way transgressed it.25 By the Seventeenth Century Coke
could cite thirty-two Royal Confirmations of the Charter.2 9 With
the passage of time, the principles enunciated by Magna Carta
became absorbed in the general stream of the Common Law and
Englishmen transferred to the Common Law the worship they
had so long reserved especially for the Charter. Of this period
it has been written:
"The Common Law is pictured invested with a halo of
dignity peculiar to the embodiment of the deepest prin-
ciples and to the highest expression of human reason and
of the Law of Nature implanted by God in the heart of Man.
As yet, men are not clear that an Act of Parliament can do
no more than declare the Common Law. It is the Common
Law which men set up as an object of worship. They regard
it as the symbol of ordered life and disciplined activities,
which are to replace the license and violence of the evil
times now passed away. . . .Common Law is the perfect
ideal of Law; for it is natural reason developed and ex-
pounded by a collective wisdom of many generations ...
Based on long usage and almost supernatural wisdom, its
authority is above rather than below the Act of Parliament
or Royal Ordinances which owe their fleeting existence to
the caprice of the King or to the pleasure of Councillors,
which have a merely material sanction and may be repealed
at any moment." 30
This attitude is reflected in the writings of Sir John For-
tescue,3' Henry VI's Chief Justice, who followed his King into
exile, and also in the later writings of Coke and Blackstone.
It was, however, in the name of the Supremacy of the Com-
mon Law that Parliament challenged the Doctrine of the Divine
Right of Kings. Coke's dictum in the Bonham Case, decided by
27 Adams and Stephens, Select Documents of English Constitutional His-
tory, 86-87 (New York, 1901).
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Figgis, Divine Right of Kings, v. IX, Non-Resistance and the Theory of
Sovereignty, 228-230 (Cambridge, 1896).
31 Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae [The Laws of England] (Tr. by
Selden, London, 1737).
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the Court of Common Pleas in 1610, has had a tremendous im-
pact upon Anglo-American Constitutional Law. It reads as
follows:
"And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the
Common Law will control Acts of Parliament, and some-
times adjudge them to be utterly void; for when an Act of
Parliament is against common right and reason, or repug-
nant, or impossible to be performed, the Common Law will
control it and adjudge such act to be void." 32
This dictum pointed the way to Judicial Review of Legis-
lative Acts and postulated the test of reasonableness. In con-
sequence it found its way into the legal literature of the time,
and was used as a weapon against Parliament's Claim to Sov-
ereignty. Coke was not expounding a Rule of Statutory Con-
struction, but was expressing a Rule of Higher Law, binding on
Parliament and the Ordinary Courts alike. In other words, Coke
regarded "common right and reason" as something fundamental
and permanent-a Higher Law. This concept is also to be found
in the Maxims with which his writings abound: "A Statute
should have Prospective, not Retrospective operation." "No one
should twice be punished for the same offense." "Every man's
house is his own castle." These and many other declarations by
Lord Coke are now familiar parts of our Jurisprudence. 3
In restoring the Great Charter to its proper place Coke
wrote that it was called "Magna Carta, not for the length or
largeness of it . . . but . . . in respect of the great weightiness
and the weighty greatness of the matter contained in it; in a few
words being the fountain of all of the Fundamental Laws of the
Realm." 34 He pointed out that the benefits of Magna Carta
extend to all. He meant the benefits of the Historical Procedures
of the Common Law, the known Processes of the Ordinary
Courts, such as Indictment by Grand Jury, Trial by the "Law
of the Land," Habeas Corpus, Security Against Monopoly, Taxa-
tion only by the Consent of Parliament.
32 Bonham's Case, 8 Coke 107a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (1610).
33 Broom, Selection of Legal Maxims (7th ed. by Manisty and Chitty, Lon-
don, 1900).
34 1 Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England, § 81 (1st Am. from the 16th
European Edition, Philadelphia, 1812); 2 Parliamentary History of England,
327 (London, 1806).
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VI. Coke's Contribution to Our Legal System
Supplemented by Locke
From Coke's version of the Magna Carta, through the Eng-
lish Declaration and Bill of Rights of 1688 and 1689, to the Bill
or Rights of our Constitution, the line is direct. Coke's great
contribution to our Legal System was later supplemented by
John Locke, whose "Second Treatise on Civil Government" first
appeared in 1690.35 Locke emphasized the Natural Rights of the
Individual resting upon a Social Compact. The primary sources
of his studies were the writings of Fortescue and Coke and his
own Conceptions of Natural Law. He shifted the emphasis from
the Individual to the People in mass. He noted the limitation on
Legislative Power and its Supremacy within the Law and not a
Power Above the Law or a license for arbitrary acts. He also
noted that the Law must be general in application, the same for
rich and poor, and that it must "dispense Justice and decide the
Rights of the Subject by promulgated standing Laws, and known
authorized Judges." 36 In saying these things, Locke was antici-
pating some of the fundamental propositions of American Con-
stitutional Law: Law must afford Equal Protection to all; it
must not operate Retroactively; it must be enforced through
the Courts; Legislative Power does not include Judicial Power.
IX. The Higher-Law Doctrine as Developed by Lord Coke
The influence of the Higher Law Doctrine,37 associated with
the names of Coke and Locke, was at its height in England
when the American Colonies were being settled. Their greatest
contribution to the American Colonists was that Legislative
Power emanates from a Sovereign People. Our Constitution
gained acceptance because it was based on the Concept of a
Higher Law, superior to the Will of the Sovereign. This out-
standing characteristic of the English Higher Law was described
by John Adams, while still a young man, as follows:
"It has been my amusement for many years past, as far
as I have had leisure, to examine the Systems of all the
Legislators, Ancient and Modern, fantastical and real . . .
and the result . . .is a settled opinion that the liberty, the
unalienable, indefeasible rights of men, the honor and
35 Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government, c. XIX, 224 (Everyman's
Ed. New York, 1924).
36 Ibid.
37 See article by Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Con-
stitutional Law, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 149 (1928); Id. at 365 (1929), reprinted in
1 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law, 1 (Chicago, 1938).
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dignity of human nature, the grandeur and glory of the
public, and the universal happiness of individuals, were
never so skillfully and successfully consulted as in that most
excellent monument of human art, the Common Law of
England." 38
To John Adams and the other Founding Fathers, the Com-
mon Law represented an embodiment of the Supremacy of the
Law which was to influence their thinking when they wrote the
Constitution. These men must have been impressed by this
tough, tenacious and yet flexible System of Law. As men of wide
learning, they were aware of the hard-won struggles of the Com-
mon Law and of the protective shield it had set up against Sov-
ereign Tyranny. They knew that the Servants of the Common
Law had spoken out boldly and truthfully before Kings to en-
force the Concept of Equal Public Justice. Their unquenchable
zeal for Justice was expressed in the maxim: "Let Justice be
done though the Heavens fall." This is the priceless heritage
upon which our Institutions were founded.
(A) The Constitution of the United States.-I have touched
upon the Origin and Development of the Common Law, and its
Contribution to our Legal System, because we, as Lawyers,
must be familiar with the Past in order to understand the Pres-
ent and to plan for the Future.
The Adoption of our Constitution was another great land-
mark in the evolution of Government by Law as opposed to
Government by Men. The Authors of that Great document suc-
ceeded in binding together those Common Law customs and
traditions which had attained the exalted status of Higher Law,
together with the Concept of the Separation of Powers. The Con-
stitution was "made for an undefined and uncertain future."
Conceived for the Government of a New Nation but recently
carved out of the wilderness, it has proved to be an effective in-
strument for the orderly Administration of a Society, whose
complexities could not have been imagined by the Founding
Fathers.
(B) The Bill of Rights.-The Bill of Rights and the sub-
sequent Amendments to the Constitution have provided a happy
blend of authority and freedom. The System of Checks and
Balances adopted therein has preserved the Supremacy of the
Law with its guarantee of Equal Justice to All. The Constitu-
tion, designed for a Government of Free Men, permits us to live
in an ordered society without fear of tyrants. It extends pro-
38 1 Adams, The Works of John Adams, 440 (Boston, 1850).
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tection to the humblest citizen while exerting restraints against
Government itself. It remains a living, pulsating document be-
cause it serves Free Men in a Free Society. This is the priceless
heritage of Liberty, Justice and Equality. Under the Law which
our forefathers bequeathed to us, we must guard it with con-
tinuous vigilance.
(C) Law, The Servant and Not the Master.-We respect
the Law because it is Our Servant, not Our Master. As Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes once aptly said:
"We of the Common Law respect Authority, but it is the
Authority of the Legal Order. We respect those who in sta-
tion, high or humble, execute the Law-because it is our
Law. We esteem them, but only as they esteem and keep
within the Law .... ,, 39
It is this Characteristic of our Law which distinguishes it from
the decrees of Totalitarian Governments which Rule by Force
and which exist only so long as their citizens are held in sub-
jection.
(D) Capacity of the Common Law for Adaptability and
Growth.-Another significant Characteristic of Our Law is its
capacity for growth and adaptation. I need only mention in
passing some of the tools employed to meet changing needs:
The Anti-Trust Laws, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the
Federal Reserve System, Minimum Hour and Wage Legislation,
the Social Security Act, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Wagner
Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade
Commission, the Federal Communications Commission and other
Regulatory Bodies, many of which have counterparts in our
State Governments. In the field of Civil Rights we are slowly
but surely also measuring up to our responsibility.
X. Conclusion
I do not suggest that those charged with the Administration
of our Law have never faltered. Human fallibility being what it
is, trial and error is to be expected. But we have managed in the
long run to provide our own corrections because of our system
of Free Expression and Independent Courts. We have not per-
mitted our Constitution to be subverted into a restraint upon
Governmental Action required for the Common Good. On the
contrary, it has been utilized as an instrument for healthy
growth.
39 Law Day U. S. A., 4 (Pamphlet Published by American Bar Association,
Chicago, May 1, 1958).
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Today our Law faces its greatest challenge. It must be de-
veloped and adjusted to meet the requirements of an Age which
has seen the secrets of nature unlocked by phenomenal advances
in science and technology. We are living in an age of atomic
fission, missiles and man-made satellites. We are witnessing in-
dustrial development on an unprecedented scale. We are con-
fronted with economic and sociological problems of vast com-
plexity. Our security is being threatened on the International
Scene at a time when the weapons of destruction are capable of
laying the World desolate. To permit our Law to lag behind the
times would be to court disaster. We must dedicate ourselves to
the task of carrying forward the precious Heritage of our Law
to the New Horizons shaping up before us. We must teach our
fellow Americans that respect for principled authority upon
which the Growth and Development of the Law feeds. We must
make them understand that only in this way will they survive as
Free Men in a Free Society.
Despite the remarkable advances in science which we are
witnessing today, the character of man remains substantially un-
changed. He still needs Stability and Justice in his social rela-
tions. He still needs protection against the Arbitrary Action of
his Government. To fulfill these needs will always be among
the loftiest concern of mankind. Each of us, therefore, is under
a stern obligation to respond to the Law's Command to secure
Justice between Man and Man and between the Citizen and his
Government. We must pursue this goal with unflagging deter-
mination and undeviating purpose.
Oppressed people throughout the World look to us for Moral
Leadership. In the competition with Dictatorships for the Minds
of Men, more potent than any lethal weapon, would be an effec-
tive demonstration that our System of Law assures more Equal
Protection Under the Law, more Security in Person and Prop-
erty and Greater Personal Freedom, than any other System yet
devised. We can and should, with the greatest moral pride, point
to our System of Law as the surest guarantee of Individual and
Collective Liberty and Freedom in a peaceful and orderly life.
We should proclaim, that a deep respect by our people, for the
Rule of Law, will ultimately lead to a lawful and peaceful exist-
ence for the World Community.
And, as Lawyers, we must assume Leadership in advancing
the Rule of Law and Reason to the Peoples of the Whole World
as mankind's best hope for survival.
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